Second Acts

Finance company deposits jump 28% past banks

By Calantha Blythemore November 21, 2026
Scattered wooden letter tiles spelling 'credit risk' on a rustic wooden surface.
Scattered wooden letter tiles spelling ‘credit risk’ on a rustic wooden surface. Photo: Markus Winkler/Pexels

Finance company deposits rose 28% in the year to June, far outpacing the 2.5% rise in credit-union and building-society deposits and the roughly 4% increase in bank deposits, according to the Reserve Bank’s latest Financial Stability Report.

The surge follows the introduction of the Depositor Compensation Scheme (DCS), which guarantees each depositor up to $100,000 if a licensed deposit taker fails. The guarantee is funded first by a levy-based fund that began filling only last year and is projected to need two decades to reach its target, leaving the Crown and taxpayers as the back-up source for now.

Funding shift and risk pricing

The DCS is effectively lowering the cost of funds for many finance companies, whose borrowers often fall outside the lending criteria of traditional banks. With public backing, these firms can access cheaper capital than they would otherwise obtain in the wholesale market.

Finance companies typically earn net interest margins above 3%, compared with the big banks that sit in the low-to-mid 2% range. Higher margins reflect the greater credit risk inherent in lending to property developers, bridge-finance borrowers and other complex clients.

Levy rates are risk-based on paper. A major bank in the lowest-risk category (RC1) pays about $37.10 per $100,000 of insured deposits each year, while a finance company in the highest-risk category (RC4) pays $63.20 – roughly 70 percent more.

In the wholesale market, an AA- rated New Zealand bank borrows at a spread of roughly 0.5 percent over government bonds for a five-year term. By contrast, lower-rated overseas institutions may pay around 7 percent over the same benchmark, meaning a B- rated entity faces a spread fourteen times larger than an AA- rated bank.

While DCS levies are not intended to mirror wholesale credit spreads, the disparity raises the question of whether the current levy structure fully reflects the higher risk the scheme insures.

Even a modest increase in levies could narrow the funding advantage that higher-risk firms enjoy, potentially curbing the incentive to chase marginal lending opportunities. Aligning levies more closely with actual credit ratings would also make the cost of protection clearer to both regulators and the public.

Moral hazard concerns

Rapid deposit inflows can pressure finance companies to expand loan books faster than sound underwriting allows. The Reserve Bank warned in its May report that such institutions might be tempted to loosen lending standards to sustain growth.

During the global financial crisis, a Crown guarantee on retail deposits spurred sizable deposit inflows to finance companies, yet nine of the thirty firms covered by the guarantee still failed, leaving taxpayers with an estimated $2 billion liability.

Dave McLeish offers three suggestions to address the moral hazard risk he sees in the Depositor Compensation Scheme: price levies accurately using existing credit ratings, impose growth limits when balance-sheet expansion outpaces capital buffers, and publish transparent data on the risk exposure the scheme underwrites.

Regulatory tools for managing scheme exposure

Regulators could tie levy calculations more closely to the credit ratings already required of deposit takers. By using those external assessments, the scheme would align contributions with the actual probability of failure, reducing the gap between public protection and private profit.

Transparency and public accountability

Stakeholders would benefit from regular publication of the aggregate risk covered by the scheme. Detailed tables showing the total insured deposits, the composition of risk categories, and the corresponding levy receipts would let taxpayers gauge the scale of the safety net.

Protecting everyday savers is absolutely the right objective, but a scheme funded, ultimately, by the public needs to get the balance right, protecting depositors without inadvertently subsidising risk-taking or giving some institutions a funding advantage at the expense of taxpayers.

Leave a Reply

© 2026 Old Ladies Rebellion. All rights reserved.